Nation-State Cyberattacks Escalate: Indian Government Systems and Romanian Elections Under Coordinated Digital Siege

Introduction

December 2024 marked a sharp escalation in nation-state cyber activity targeting democratic institutions and government infrastructure. Two developments stand out: a sustained rise in cyberattacks against Indian government entities between 2019 and 2023, culminating in heightened December activity, and an aggressive, coordinated cyber campaign attributed to Russian threat actors against Romania’s presidential election systems.

These incidents underscore a broader global pattern: state-sponsored cyber operations are increasingly blending espionage, disruption, credential harvesting, and influence operations to undermine public trust in governance and electoral legitimacy. This article examines the technical and strategic implications of both cases, highlighting tactics, objectives, and defensive lessons.


Rising Cyberattacks on Indian Government Systems (2019–2024 Trend)

Between 2019 and 2023, Indian government entities experienced a significant increase in reported cyber incidents. December 2024 reporting indicates that this upward trajectory has continued, reflecting both expanded attack surfaces and the persistent targeting of national infrastructure by advanced threat actors.

Key Drivers Behind the Surge

  1. Geopolitical Tensions
    India’s geopolitical positioning has made it a strategic intelligence target for multiple nation-state actors seeking diplomatic, military, and economic intelligence.
  2. Digital Expansion of Public Services
    Rapid digitization of public services, citizen portals, and e-governance platforms has expanded exposure to:
    • Web application attacks
    • API abuse
    • Credential stuffing
    • Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) campaigns
  3. Supply Chain Exposure
    Third-party vendors and managed service providers represent high-value access vectors into government networks.

Observed Tactics and Techniques

While detailed forensic reporting varies across agencies, common patterns include:

  • Spear-phishing campaigns targeting ministry staff and contractors
  • Exploitation of unpatched internet-facing services
  • Web shell deployment for persistence
  • Credential harvesting via cloned government portals
  • DDoS campaigns aimed at service disruption

These behaviors align closely with techniques documented in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, including:

  • Initial Access via Phishing (T1566)
  • Exploitation of Public-Facing Applications (T1190)
  • Credential Dumping (T1003)
  • Web Shell (T1505.003)

The increased volume between 2019–2023 suggests not only persistent reconnaissance but also a maturing adversarial understanding of Indian government network architecture.


Russian-Linked Attacks on Romania’s Presidential Election

In a separate but strategically aligned development, Romanian authorities reported that Russian hackers conducted over 85,000 cyberattacks targeting election systems shortly before and during the presidential vote in December 2024.

The timing is critical: attacks peaked immediately before and during active voting, indicating intent beyond intelligence gathering.

Nature of the Attacks

Reported activity included:

  • Mass automated requests against election infrastructure
  • DDoS attempts targeting election-related websites
  • Credential leaks and data dumps timed to influence public perception
  • Attempts to probe authentication systems

Unlike conventional espionage campaigns, this operation combined:

  • Disruption
  • Information operations
  • Psychological influence tactics

The credential leaks, released just prior to and during the vote, appear strategically designed to:

  • Erode voter confidence
  • Create confusion regarding system integrity
  • Amplify misinformation narratives

Strategic Objectives of Election-Focused Cyber Operations

Election system targeting typically serves one or more of the following goals:

  1. Delegitimization of Democratic Processes
    Even unsuccessful attacks can create the perception of compromised integrity.
  2. Information Operations Amplification
    Leaked credentials or partial datasets can be weaponized in disinformation campaigns.
  3. Operational Testing
    Elections provide real-world testing environments for cyber capabilities.
  4. Political Signaling
    Demonstrating reach and capability sends geopolitical messages without crossing conventional military thresholds.

Technical Assessment: Volume vs. Impact

The reported figure of 85,000 attacks does not necessarily indicate 85,000 successful breaches. In high-profile events, adversaries often:

  • Conduct automated scanning and credential spraying at scale
  • Trigger DDoS traffic bursts to test resilience
  • Attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities opportunistically

From a defensive standpoint, raw attack volume matters less than:

  • Detection speed
  • Containment capability
  • Network segmentation
  • Backup and recovery maturity

However, even failed attempts achieve a psychological objective when publicly disclosed.


Converging Trends in Nation-State Cyber Activity

Both the Indian and Romanian cases reflect three converging trends in 2024:

1. Hybrid Operations

Cyberattacks increasingly accompany influence and psychological operations.

2. Timing Precision

Attacks are strategically aligned with politically sensitive events, such as elections or parliamentary sessions.

3. Credential-Centric Targeting

Leaked credentials remain a powerful and low-cost destabilization tool.


Defensive Priorities for Governments

To counter similar campaigns, governments should prioritize:

  • Zero Trust architecture implementation
  • Continuous vulnerability management for public-facing services
  • Multi-factor authentication enforcement across all election and government systems
  • Real-time DDoS mitigation services
  • Coordinated cyber-intelligence sharing between public and private sectors
  • Pre-election red teaming and tabletop exercises

Election infrastructure should be treated as critical national infrastructure (CNI) with dedicated SOC monitoring and incident response escalation pathways.


Broader Geopolitical Implications

These December 2024 developments reinforce a reality already apparent across NATO and Indo-Pacific regions: cyber operations are now a primary instrument of statecraft.

They offer adversaries:

  • Plausible deniability
  • Low-cost asymmetric leverage
  • High strategic visibility
  • Psychological amplification via media coverage

The cumulative effect is not necessarily immediate system compromise—but gradual erosion of institutional trust.